[1] VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 182 (1986) (quoting a letter sent from a couple in Alabama to Judge Barrington Parker, who presided over the John Hinckley, Jr., trial). Return to text.

[2] HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 23 (1996). Return to text.

[3] See, e.g., HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 182. Return to text.

[4] See Fox Butterfield, Serious Crime Decreased for Fifth Year in a Row, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at 10. Return to text.

[5] See Yolanda Balido, S. Dade Gets 10 New Police Officers; Activists Want More, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 15, 1996, at SS3; Elaine De Valle, Gables Anti-Crime Panel Gets Down to Work, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 1996, at CT3. Return to text.

[6] See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 896 (1995) (stating that the recidivism rate for "robbery among previously convicted robbers was 19.6%, for assault was 21.9%, for burglary was 31.9%, for larceny was 33.5%, and for drug offenses was 24.8%"). Return to text.

[7] ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 199. Return to text.

[8] See id. Return to text.

[9] Id. Return to text.

[10] See id. at 200 (referring to the Rodney King trial, the Reginald Denny trial, the O.J. Simpson trial, and the first Menendez brothers trial, respectively). Return to text.

[11] See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1995). Return to text.

[12] BLACK 'S LAW DICTIONARY 741 (6th ed. 1990). Return to text.

[13] See, e.g., State v. Sawyer, 630 A.2d 1064, 1076-77 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[14] See State v. Labanowski, 816 P.2d 26, 34 (Wash. 1991). Return to text.

[15] See id. Return to text.

[16] Id. Return to text.

[17] See Sawyer, 630 A.2d at 1077 (Katz, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[18] See id. Justice Katz's dissent referred to two studies. The Chicago Jury Project found hung juries in 5.5% of cases studied by Kalven and Ziesel. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 57 (1966). A California jury study determined hung juries resulted in 12.2% of the cases. See Leo J. Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the Jury Is Deadlocked?, 61 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1977). Return to text.

[19] KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 7. Return to text.

[20] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 31. Return to text.

[21] See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 349 (Cooley ed. 1899)). While some scholars had traced the origin of the jury trial to the Magna Carta, modern historians now reject this view. See id. at 151 n.16 (citing 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 173 n.3 (2d ed. 1909)). Return to text.

[22] See id. at 152. Return to text.

[23] See id. Return to text.

[24] Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress 1765 ¶ 7, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 270 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952). The Stamp Act Congress comprised nine colonies meeting in New York in October 1765. See Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 144, 153 (1996). The Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (Eng.), gave the vice-admiralty courts, which operated without juries, jurisdiction over actions brought to enforce stamp tax penalties and forfeitures. See id. § 48. Return to text.

[25] SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 24, at 270. Return to text.

[26] U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Return to text.

[27] See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869 (1994). Return to text.

[28] See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . ."). Return to text.

[29] Other guarantees of individual rights in the Constitution are the Habeas Corpus Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, the Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clause, id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, the Obligation of Contracts Clause, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, the Treason Clause, id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1, the Corruption of Blood Clause, id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, id. art. IV, § 1, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Return to text.

[30] Altschuler and Deiss note that "[l]ess explicitly, the First Amendment may have reiterated Article VI's prohibition of religious tests for office-holding." Altschuler & Deiss, supra note 27, at 870 n.13 (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 US 488, 491-93 (1961)). Return to text.

[31] See id. at 870 (citing 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 69 (Oct. 14, 1774) (U.S. G.P.O., 1904)). Return to text.

[32] See id. Return to text.

[33] See id. (citing Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 258, 269 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1987)). Return to text.

[34] See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). Return to text.

[35] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 31 ("England, Scotland, Wales, and Canada do not have as liberal a standard [as the United States] concerning trial by jury."). Return to text.

[36] See id. Return to text.

[37] See e.g., ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 213. Return to text.

[38] See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407 n.2 (1972) (citing 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (1956)). Return to text.

[39] See id. Return to text.

[40] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171; see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (citing William Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 21 MISS. L.J. 185, 191 (1950)). Return to text.

[41] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171-72. Return to text.

[42] See id. at 172. Return to text.

[43] See id.; see also Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 n.2 (citing Ryan, Less than Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 211, 213 (1967)). Return to text.

[44] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 171-72. Return to text.

[45] See id. Return to text.

[46] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 409 n.2 (citing THEODORE F. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956)); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[47] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[48] See id. Return to text.

[49] See id. Return to text.

[50] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407 n.2 (citing MAUDE V. CLARKE, MEDIEVAL REPRESENTATION AND CONSENT 251 (1964)). Return to text.

[51] See id. Return to text.

[52] See id. (citing Theodore F. Plucknett, The Lancastrian Constitution, in TUDOR STUDIES 161, 169-70 (R. Seton-Watson ed. 1924)). Return to text.

[53] See id. Return to text.

[54] See id. at 407-08 n.2 (citing 1 KENNETH W. PICKTHORN, EARLY TUDOR GOVERNMENT: HENRY VII, at 93 (1967)). Return to text.

[55] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[56] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08 (citing John M. Murrin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 415 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1971)). Return to text.

[57] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[58] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 407-08. Return to text.

[59] See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 n.45 (1970) (listing Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and South Carolina as the states that authorized majority verdicts). Return to text.

[60] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 408 n.3 (citing Murrin, supra note 56, at 415). Return to text.

[61] See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). Return to text.

[62] See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[63] See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, ch. 80 (Eng.); see also HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172. Return to text.

[64] See sources cited supra note 63. Return to text.

[65] HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 1, at 172 (quoting Roy Jenkins). Return to text.

[66] 406 U.S. 356 (1972). Return to text.

[67] 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Return to text.

[68] See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358. Return to text.

[69] See id. Return to text.

[70] See id. Return to text.

[71] See id. Return to text.

[72] Id. at 357-58 n.1 (quoting LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41). Return to text.

[73] See id. at 358 n.1 (citing LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 782). Return to text.

[74] See id. at 358. Return to text.

[75] See id. Return to text.

[76] See id. at 357-58. Return to text.

[77] See id. at 359. Return to text.

[78] Id. at 360. Return to text.

[79] See id. at 360-61. Return to text.

[80] Id. at 361. Return to text.

[81] Id. at 362. Return to text.

[82] Id. Return to text.

[83] See id.

Jury verdicts finding guilty beyond a reasonable doubt are regularly sustained even though the evidence was such that the jury would have been justified in having a reasonable doubt, even though the trial judge might not have reached the same conclusion as the jury, and even though appellate judges are closely divided on the issue whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
Id. (citations omitted). Return to text.

[84] See id. at 363 (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910)). Return to text.

[85] See id. Return to text.

[86] See id. at 363-64. Return to text.

[87] See id. at 364. Return to text.

[88] See id. ("Appellant might well have been ultimately acquitted had he committed a capital offense. But . . . this does not constitute a denial of equal protection of the law; the State may treat capital offenders differently without violating the constitutional rights of those charged with lesser crimes."). Return to text.

[89] See id. at Return to text.

[90] See id. at 380-94 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 395-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 399-403 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[91] See id. at 397-99 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice Stewart's dissent. See id. at 397. Return to text.

[92] Id. at 398. Return to text.

[93] See id. ("[C]ommunity confidence in the administration of criminal justice cannot but be corroded under a system in which a defendant who is conspicuously identified with a particular group can be acquitted or convicted by a jury split along group lines."). Return to text.

[94] 406 U.S. 404 (1972). Return to text.

[95] See id. at 405-06. Return to text.

[96] See id. at 405. Return to text.

[97] See id. at 406. Return to text.

[98] Id. at 406 n.1 (quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 11). Return to text.

[99] See id. at 406 (following Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). The question before the Court in Williams was "whether the constitutional guarantee of a trial by 'jury' necessarily requires trial by exactly 12 persons, rather than some lesser number—in this case six." 399 U.S. at 86. The Williams Court held that "the 12-man panel is not a necessary ingredient of 'trial by jury,' and that respondent's refusal to impanel more than the six members provided for by Florida law did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Return to text.

[100] See id. at 407-11. Return to text.

[101] Id. at 410. Return to text.

[102] See id. Return to text.

[103] Id. at 410-11. Return to text.

[104] See id. at 411. Return to text.

[105] See id. Return to text.

[106] See id. Return to text.

[107] See id. Return to text.

[108] See id. Return to text.

[109] See id. at 412. Return to text.

[110] See id.; see also Johnson, 406 U.S. at 363. Return to text.

[111] See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412-13. Return to text.

[112] See id. at 413. Return to text.

[113] Id. Return to text.

[114] See id. Return to text.

[115] See id. Return to text.

[116] See Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406. Return to text.

[117] See, e.g., Johnson, 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[U]nanimity is one of the indispensable features of federal jury trial."); see also ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 213. Interestingly, the Supreme Court recently has noted that this federal right "is more accurately characterized as a due process right than as one under the Sixth Amendment." Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.5 (1991). Return to text.

[118] 406 U.S. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring). Return to text.

[119] See id. Return to text.

[120] See ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 213. Return to text.

[121] See id. Return to text.

[122] See id. Return to text.

[123] See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Stephen Saltzburg, Understanding the Jury with the Help of Social Science, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1120 (1985) (reviewing HASTIE ET AL., supra). Return to text.

[124] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 173. Return to text.

[125] See id. Return to text.

[126] See id. at 173-74. Return to text.

[127] See id. at 173. Return to text.

[128] See id. Return to text.

[129] See id. Return to text.

[130] See id. Return to text.

[131] See id. at 227-33. Return to text.

[132] See id. at 173. Return to text.

[133] See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 488. Return to text.

[134] See id. Return to text.

[135] See id. Return to text.

[136] Id. at 489. Return to text.

[137] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 173. Return to text.

[138] See David A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making?, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 275, 298 (1996). Return to text.

[139] 406 U.S. at 389 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Return to text.

[140] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 173-74. Return to text.

[141] ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 214. "[Kalven and Zeisel] also concluded that deliberation [in unanimity-rule juries] did not change votes through reasoning, but rather through intimidation and peer pressure." Return to text.

[142] Id. Return to text.

[143] See id. Return to text.

[144] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 173. Return to text.

[145] See Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes That Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 331 (1989). Return to text.

[146] HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 116-17. Return to text.

[147] See id. at 173. Return to text.

[148] ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 214-15. Return to text.

[149] See Saltzburg, supra note 123, at 1134. Return to text.

[150] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 78-82. Return to text.

[151] See id. at 77. Return to text.

[152] See id. Return to text.

[153] See id. at 173.

Return to text.

[154] See HASTIE ET AL., supra note 123, at 173. Return to text.

[155] See Saltzburg, supra note 123, at 1134. Return to text.

[156] See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 18, at 461. Return to text.

[157] See id. Return to text.

[158] See ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 214. Return to text.

[159] See id. at 215. Return to text.

[160] See id. at 200-01. Return to text.

[161] Id. at 197 (quoting a juror). Return to text.

[162] Id. at 199 (quoting another juror). Return to text.

[163] See Amar, supra note 11, at 1189-90. Return to text.

[164] See id. at 1189. Return to text.

[165] See id. Return to text.

[166] See id. Return to text.

[167] See id. Return to text.

[168] Id. Return to text.

[169] Saltzburg, supra note 123, at 1132. Return to text.

[170] See 406 U.S. at 406. Return to text.

[171] See ROTHWAX, supra note 2, at 213. Return to text.