[*] Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, 1974-Present; B.S., The University of Florida, 1951; J.D., The University of Florida School of Law, 1952; L.L.M., University of Virginia, 1984. Justice Overton served as Chief Justice from 1976-1978 and is the senior member of the Court. He currently chairs the Florida Courts Technology Commission, was instrumental in placing Florida's Supreme Court on the Internet, and is a frequent speaker on the influence of technology on the courts. He served on the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission and chaired its judiciary committee. He is also an adjunct professor at Florida State University's College of Law, where he teaches Florida Constitutional Law. Return to text.

[**] Career Attorney, Florida Supreme Court, 1992-Present; B.S., The Florida State University, 1989; J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 1992. Ms. Giddings is a research attorney to Justice Overton, was co-coordinator of the Florida Supreme Court Internet Public Service Project, is the law clerk liaison for technology implementation at the Court, and teaches computerized legal research and the Internet to Florida's judges at Florida's College of Advanced Judicial Studies. Return to text.

[1] See ANN CAVOUKIAN & DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 89 (1997) (listing results of a 1995 Equifax-Harris Mid-Decade Consumer Privacy Survey). Return to text.

[2] See id. (listing results of a 1995 privacy survey by Yankelovich Partners). Return to text.

[3] See Doug Stanley, Big Brother Attitude Thrives in Workplace, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 1, 1997, at 6. Return to text.

[4] FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. Return to text.

[5] See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[6] See infra notes 87-108 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[7] See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[8] See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[9] United States Dep't of Def. v. Federal Lab. Rel. Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994) (interpreting the Freedom of Information Act). Return to text.

[10] CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 80. Return to text.

[11] Id. at 51-52. Return to text.

[12] JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE 22 (1992). Return to text.

[13] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 53. Return to text.

[14] See id. at 102. Return to text.

[15] See BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, PROTECT YOUR PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 7 (1997). Return to text.

[16] See Trudie Bushey, FTC & Internet Privacy, CREDIT WORLD, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 7. Return to text.

[17] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 56-58; ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 15. Return to text.

[18] Chris O'Malley, Welcome to a Small Town Called the Internet, POPULAR SCIENCE, Jan. 1997, at 56, 57. Return to text.

[19] David McKendry, Peep Show, CA MAG., Sept. 1996, at 16. Return to text.

[20] See Internet Department of Motor Vehicles (visited July 13, 1997) (containing driver's license information and history for all fifty states for a fee). Return to text.

[21] See id. Motor vehicle information for all fifty states is also available. Return to text.

[22] For a fee, one service will provide an abundance of information regarding social security numbers. See The Stalker's Home Page (visited July 13, 1997) . This site also includes a number of other items regarding privacy. Return to text.

[23] See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 15; McKendry, supra note 19, at 16. Return to text.

[24] See infra Part III. Return to text.

[25] See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12. Return to text.

[26] See id. at 78; ALFRED GLOSSBRENNER & JOHN ROSENBERG, ONLINE RESOURCES FOR BUSINESS 30, 126 (1995). Return to text.

[27] See WESTLAW PUBLISHING CORP., WESTLAW DATABASE DIRECTORY 141-44 (1997). Return to text.

[28] See, e.g., Leon County Property Appraiser's Office (visited July 13, 1997) . See e.g. Experianexpo (formerly known as TRW) (visited July 13, 1997) . Return to text.

[30] A vast number of international and national telephone on-line directories are available. See e.g., Switchboard (visited July 13, 1997) (includes maps to place of number); Infospace Directory (visited July 13, 1997) (includes door-to-door instructions to addresses); Yahoo Phone Directory (visited July 13, 1997) ; Database America (visted July 13, 1997) ; Four 11 (visited July 13, 1997) . Return to text.

[31] See FECInfo (visited July 13, 1997) . Return to text.

[32] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 77-78. Return to text.

[33] See id. at 83. Return to text.

[34] See id. Return to text.

[35] See id. at 82. Return to text.

[36] See Big Brother: The All-Seeing Eye, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1997, at 52. Return to text.

[37] See John Markoff, Technologies Battle at New Frontier of Eavesdropping, TALL. DEM., Jan. 19, 1997, at 6A. Return to text.

[38] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 56-57. Return to text.

[39] See Abner K. Mikva, The Mixed Blessing of Public Disclosure, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Jan. 7, 1997, at A2. Return to text.

[40] CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 66. Return to text.

[41] See Fla. S.B. 220 (1997); see also infra note 173 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[42] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 54. Return to text.

[43] THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 29 (1st ed. 1880). Return to text.

[44] See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Return to text.

[45] There are four types of privacy at issue in tort litigation, separate and apart from the type of privacy at issue under the federal or Florida constitutions: (1) appropriation; (2) intrusion; (3) public disclosure of private facts; and (4) false light in the public eye. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). For many years Florida has recognized the right to sue in tort for the civil wrong of invasion of privacy. See Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); see also infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[46] See Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., concurring). Return to text.

[47] 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Return to text.

[48] See id. at 484-85. Return to text.

[49] See id. at 485. Return to text.

[50] See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977). Return to text.

[51] See id. Return to text.

[52] See id. at 600 n.24. Return to text.

[53] See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). Return to text.

[54] See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Return to text.

[55] See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997); Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). Return to text.

[56] See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). Return to text.

[57] See id.; see also Whalen 429 U.S. at 599-600 (finding that a state law requiring doctors to report the dispensing of "dangerous drugs" did not violate a constitutionally protected zone of privacy); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (finding that the police chief did not violate an alleged shoplifter's constitutionally protected right to privacy by distributing a flyer identifying the plaintiff as a criminal). Return to text.

[58] 433 U.S. 425 (1977). Return to text.

[59] See id. at 456. Return to text.

[60] 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Return to text.

[61] See id. at 599-600. Return to text.

[62] 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994), see, e.g., United States Dep't of Def. v. Federal Lab. Rel. Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994). Return to text.

[63] See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that evidence collected by the FBI through an electronic listening and recording device attached to the outside of a telephone booth violated the Fourth Amendment). Return to text.

[64] Id. at 350-51 (footnotes omitted). Return to text.

[65] At the time Florida adopted its constitutional right to privacy, at least ten states, including Florida, had some type of privacy provision in their constitution. However, all but three states limited their right to privacy to issues involving search and seizure.

In addition to the explicit right of privacy contained in article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution, Florida citizens have also adopted a specific provision prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures similar to that contained in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. That provision, however, grants no additional protection against searches and seizures than that available under the federal constitution due to a 1982 amendment, which provides that section 12 shall be construed in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. See Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1988). Return to text.

[66] Justice Overton noted the following in his opening remarks:

Another factor that should be recognized is that changes in our way of life occur very rapidly. Thomas Jefferson said this country was "advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye." That quotation is very true in this day and time. Our technological advancements continue to surpass our imagination, but our political and economic problems also are increased with this advancement.
Ten years ago no one knew that shortly we would have a great national concern about energy and its control.
And who, ten years ago, really understood that personal and financial data on a substantial part of our population could be collected by government or business and held for easy distribution by computer operated information systems? There is a public concern about how personal information concerning an individual citizen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business. The subject of individual privacy and privacy law is in a developing stage. [A number of] states have adopted some form of privacy legislation, and many appellate courts in this nation now have substantial right of privacy issues before them for consideration. It is a new problem that should be addressed.
CHIEF JUSTICE BEN F. OVERTON, REPORT TO THE CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION 2-3 (1977) (on file with FLA. ST. U. L. REV., Tallahassee, Fla.); see also Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Note, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 674 (1978). Return to text.

[67] The proposed provision as drafted by the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission read as follows:

Section 23. Right of privacy.—Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.
WEST PUBLISING CO., PROPOSED REVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION 8 (1978) (on file with the Florida Supreme Court Library and the FLA. ST. U. L. REV., Tallahassee, Fla.). Return to text.

[68] See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 387 (Reg. Sess. 1980) (proposing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23). The official ballot analysis of the proposed amendment provided as follows: "[p]roposing the creation of Section 23 of Article I of the State Constitution establishing a constitutional right of privacy." Id. No official analysis other than this summary was included in the resolution. The joint resolution was enacted through the efforts of then Representative Jon L. Mills and other members of the Legislature. Return to text.

[69] FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (emphasis added). Return to text.

[70] See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (extending privacy rights involving abortion to minors); B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995) (protecting a minor's decision to have consensual sex). The right to privacy also belongs to persons who are incompetent. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (extending the right of privacy to refuse medical treatment to persons who have requested that medical treatment be discontinued prior to becoming incompetent). Return to text.

[71] 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983) (holding that the Board of Bar Examiners requirement that all medical records, including records of psychological treatment, be disclosed was the least intrusive means to achieve a compelling state interest and was, therefore, constitutional). Return to text.

[72] See id. at 74. Return to text.

[73] Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990). Return to text.

[74] See Department of Comm'y Aff. v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995) (holding that the right to privacy was not implicated by an ordinance prohibiting the erection of fences in specified areas in order to protect an endangered species of deer). Return to text.

[75] See State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991); State v. Hume, 512 So. 2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1987). Return to text.

[76] See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1995). Return to text.

[77] See Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 1995) (finding that judicial records are not subject to chapter 119, Florida Statutes). Return to text.

[78] 531 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1988). Return to text.

[79] See id. at 118. Return to text.

[80] 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992). Return to text.

[81] Id. at 552. Return to text.

[82] FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24:

Section 24. Access to public records and meetings— (a) Every person has the right to inspect or copy any public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons acting on their behalf, except with respect to records exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government and each agency or department created thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution. (b) All meetings of any collegial public body of the executive branch of state government or of any collegial public body of a county, municipality, school district, or special district, at which official acts are to be taken or at which public business of such body is to be transacted or discussed, shall be open and noticed to the public and meetings of the legislature shall be open and noticed as provided in Article III, Section 4(e), except with respect to meetings exempted pursuant to this section or specifically closed by this Constitution. (c) This section shall be self-executing. The legislature, however, may provide by general law for the exemption of records from the requirements of subsection (a) and the exemption of meetings from the requirements of subsection (b), provided that such law shall state with specificity the public necessity justifying the exemption and shall be no broader than necessary to accomplish the stated purpose of the law. The legislature shall enact laws governing the enforcement of this section, including the maintenance, control, destruction, disposal, and disposition of records made public by this section, except that each house of the legislature may adopt rules governing the enforcement of this section in relation to records of the legislative branch. Laws enacted pursuant to this subsection shall contain only exemptions from the requirements of subsections (a) or (b) and provisions governing the enforcement of this section, and shall relate to one subject. (d) All laws that are in effect on July 1, 1993 that limit public access to records or meetings shall remain in force, and such laws apply to records of the legislative and judicial branches, until they are repealed. Rules of court that are in effect on the date of adoption of this section that limit access to records shall remain in effect until they are repealed. Return to text.

[83] FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.050. Return to text.

[84] 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). Return to text.

[85] See id. at 547. Return to text.

[86] See id. Return to text.

[87] 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989). Return to text.

[88] See id. at 1195. Return to text.

[89] 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Return to text.

[90] See In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990). Return to text.

[91] John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Return to text.

[92] See Rodriquez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Return to text.

[93] See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993). Return to text.

[94] See FLA. STAT. ch. 765 (1995); see also Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14. Return to text.

[95] See Krischer v. McIver, 22 Fla. L. Weekly S443 (Fla. 1997). Return to text.

[96] See Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc., Inc., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980). Return to text.

[97] See id. at 638. Return to text.

[98] See id. at 639. Return to text.

[99] 653 So. 2d 1025 (1995). Return to text.

[100] See id. at 1026-27. Return to text.

[101] See id. at 1028. Return to text.

[102] 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983). Return to text.

[103] 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985). Return to text.

[104] 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987). Return to text.

[105] 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989). Return to text.

[106] See id. at 149 n.3 ("[A pen register is] a device which records or decodes electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such device is attached . . . ."); FLA. STAT. § 934.02(20) (1995). Return to text.

[107] 670 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1996). Return to text.

[108] See infra notes 109-39 and accompanying text (discussing general civil privacy torts). Return to text.

[109] See PROSSER, supra note 45, at § 117. Return to text.

[110] See id. § 117, at 804. Return to text.

[111] See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 851 (5th ed. 1984). Return to text.

[112] See DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY § 6.2, at 380 (1991). Return to text.

[113] See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 852. Return to text.

[114] See id. § 117, at 852-54. Return to text.

[115] Id. § 117, at 854. Return to text.

[116] See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.1, at 16. Return to text.

[117] See id. § 2.1, at 16-17. Return to text.

[118] See id. §§ 2.4-2.5; KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 855. Return to text.

[119] See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 855. Return to text.

[120] See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.10, at 57; id. § 2.11, at 64. Return to text.

[121] See id. § 3.1, at 150. Return to text.

[122] See KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 117, at 856-57. Return to text.

[123] See id. Return to text.

[124] See id. § 117, at 856-57, 863. Return to text.

[125] See id. § 117, at 864 (stating that false light is often defamatory). Return to text.

[126] See ELDER, supra note 112, § 4.1, at 261. Return to text.

[127] See id. § 4.2, at 270. Return to text.

[128] See id.; id. § 4.3, at 274; id. § 4.4, at 282. Return to text.

[129] 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Return to text.

[130] See id. at 389-90. Return to text.

[131] 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). Return to text.

[132] See id. at 250-51. Return to text.

[133] Id. at 251. Return to text.

[134] See id. at 244-45. Return to text.

[135] See id. at 251. Return to text.

[136] See id. at 251-53. Return to text.

[137] See, e.g., Resha v. Tucker, 670 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 1996); Cape Pub., Inc. v. Hitchner, 549 So. 2d 1374, 1377 (Fla. 1989); Forsberg v. Housing Auth. of the City of Miami Beach, 455 So. 2d 373, 374 (Overton, J., concurring). Return to text.

[138] See ELDER, supra note 112, § 2.5, at 40. Return to text.

[139] See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 30:20, at 913-16 (1991). Return to text.

[140] Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)). Return to text.

[141] 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E) (1994). Return to text.

[142] See Jeffrey Rothfeder, Invasion of Privacy, PC WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 152 [hereinafter Invasion of Privacy]. Return to text.

[143] See id. Return to text.

[144] Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994)). Return to text.

[145] ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 125. Return to text.

[146] See Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 571 (1974) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994)). Return to text.

[147] See Student Press Law Ctr. v. Alexander, 778 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (D.D.C. 1991). Return to text.

[148] Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1994)). Return to text.

[149] See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 26-27. Return to text.

[150] Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994)). Return to text.

[151] Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1992)). Return to text.

[152] See 15 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(D)(ii) (1994). Return to text.

[153] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 70; O'Malley, supra note 18, at 58. Return to text.

[154] See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center (visited July 13, 1997) (providing current information on proposed federal legislation regarding privacy interests). Return to text.

[155] H.R. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). Return to text.

[156] H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1997). Return to text.

[157] H.R. 49, 105th Cong. (1997). Return to text.

[158] H.R. 341, 105th Cong. (1997). Return to text.

[159] S. 144, 105th Cong. (1997). Return to text.

[160] See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.0455(8)(a) (1995) ("A sample shall be collected with due regard to the privacy of the individual providing the sample . . . ."). Return to text.

[161] See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.026(4)(a)(2) (1995) ("Every patient who is provided health care services retains certain rights to privacy, which must be respected without regard to the patient's economic status or source of payment for his care."). Return to text.

[162] See FLA. STAT. § 395.3025(4) (1995) ("Patient records shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed without the consent of the person to whom they pertain . . . ."). Return to text.

[163] See FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (1995):

(1) No person shall publish, print, display or otherwise publicly use for purposes of trade or for any commercial or advertising purpose the name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness of any natural person without the express written or oral consent to such use given by:

(a) Such person; or

(b) Any other person, firm or corporation authorized in writing by such person to license the commercial use of his name or likeness; or

(c) If such person is deceased, any person, firm or corporation authorized in writing to license the commercial use of his name or likeness, or if no person, firm or corporation is so authorized, then by any one from among a class composed of his surviving spouse and surviving children.

(2) In the event the consent required in subsection (1) is not obtained, the person whose name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness is so used, or any person, firm, or corporation authorized by such person in writing to license the commercial use of his name or likeness, or, if the person whose likeness is used is deceased, any person, firm, or corporation having the right to give such consent, as provided hereinabove, may bring an action to enjoin such unauthorized publication, printing, display or other public use, and to recover damages for any loss or injury sustained by reason thereof, including an amount which would have been a reasonable royalty, and punitive or exemplary damages.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to:

(a) The publication, printing, display, or use of the name or likeness of any person in any newspaper, magazine, book, news broadcast or telecast, or other news medium or publication as part of any bona fide news report or presentation having a current and legitimate public interest and where such name or likeness is not used for advertising purposes;

(b) The use of such name, portrait, photograph, or other likeness in connection with the resale or other distribution of literary, musical, or artistic productions or other articles of merchandise or property where such person has consented to the use of his name, portrait, photograph, or likeness on or in connection with the initial sale or distribution thereof; or

(c) Any photograph of a person solely as a member of the public and where such person is not named or otherwise identified in or in connection with the use of such photograph.

(4) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any publication, printing, display, or other public use of the name or likeness of a person occurring after the expiration of 40 years from and after the death of such person.

(5) As used in this section, a person's "surviving spouse" is the person's surviving spouse under the law of his domicile at the time of his death, whether or not the spouse has later remarried; and a person's "children" are his immediate offspring and any children legally adopted by him. Any consent provided for in subsection (1) shall be given on behalf of a minor by the guardian of his person or by either parent.

(6) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to and not in limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the common law against the invasion of his privacy. Return to text.

[164] See Loft v. Fuller, 408 So. 2d 619, 622-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Return to text.

[165] See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1996). In 1995, Ram Avrahami sued U.S. News & World Report, Inc., after he subscribed to that publication, and it thereafter "rented" his name to the Smithsonian Institution. See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., No. 95-7479 (Gen. Dist. Ct. of Arlington Co., Va. July 21, 1995) (available at ). Relief was also sought under a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff claiming that he had a property right in his name and that the publication had exercised dominion over that property without his permission. The trial court denied relief and subsequent appeals of that decision were unsuccessful. See Avrahami v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., No. 961837 (Va. 1996), reh'g denied (Va. 1996) (on file with author). Return to text.

[166] See FLA. STAT. § 934.01(2)(1995). The Legislature found that:

[i]n order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of intrastate commerce, it is necessary for the Legislature to define the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized and to prohibit any unauthorized interception of such communications and the use of the contents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceedings. Return to text.

[167] See FLA. STAT. § 365.16(a) (1995):

[Anyone who m]akes a telephone call to a location at which the person receiving the call has a reasonable expectation of privacy; during such call makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, vulgar, or indecent; and by such call or such language intends to offend, annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any person at the called number; . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Return to text.

[168] See FLA. STAT. § 68.07(j) (1995) ("[t]hat the petition is filed for no ulterior or illegal purpose and granting it will not in any manner invade the property rights of others, whether partnership, patent, good will, privacy, trademark or otherwise.") (emphasis added). Return to text.

[169] See FLA. STAT. § 97.058(2)(e) (1995):

If you believe that someone has interfered with your right to register or to decline to register to vote, your right to privacy in deciding whether to register or in applying to register to vote, or your right to choose your own political party or other political preference, you may file a complaint with the Secretary of State. Return to text.

[170] See FLA. STAT. § 213.015 (1995):

There is created a Florida Taxpayer's Bill of Rights to guarantee that the rights, privacy, and property of Florida taxpayers are adequately safeguarded and protected during tax assessment, collection, and enforcement processes administered under the revenue laws of this state. The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights compiles, in one document, brief but comprehensive statements which explain, in simple, nontechnical terms, the rights and obligations of the Department of Revenue and taxpayers. The rights afforded taxpayers to assure that their privacy and property are safeguarded and protected during tax assessment and collection are available only insofar as they are implemented in other parts of the Florida Statutes or rules of the Department of Revenue.

(emphasis added). Return to text.

[171] See FLA. STAT. § 228.093(1) (1995). Return to text.

[172] FLA. STAT. § 627.4091(3) (1995). Return to text.

[173] Fla. SB 220 (1997). Return to text.

[174] See id. § 1(2). Return to text.

[175] See id. Return to text.

[176] WIS. STAT. § 13.58(5)(a)(1) (1995). Return to text.

[177] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798-1798.76 (West 1995). Return to text.

[178] Id. § 1798.1. Return to text.

[179] Id. § 1798.3(a) (emphasis added). Return to text.

[180] O'Malley, supra note 18, at 58-59. Return to text.

[181] See 1995 Minn. H.F. 2816, 79th Leg. (1995). Return to text.

[182] See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Eur. O.J. L281/31 (Nov. 23, 1995) (available at ). Return to text.

[183] See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: PUBLIC WORKSHOP ON CONSUMER PRIVACY ON THE GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTUCTURE App. B (1996). Return to text.

[184] See id.; see also Stanley, supra note 3, at 25. Return to text.

[185] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 25. Return to text.

[186] Id. Return to text.

[187] The Canadian Standards Association's Privacy Principles are as follows:

ACCOUNTABILITY An organization is responsible for personal information under its control and shall designate an individual or individuals who are accountable for the organization's compliance with the following principles.

IDENTIFYING PURPOSES The purposes for which personal information is collected shall be identified by the organization at or before the time the information is collected.

CONSENT The knowledge and consent of the individual are required for the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information, except where inappropriate.

LIMITING COLLECTION The collection of personal information shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purposes identified by the organization. Information shall be collected by fair and lawful means.

LIMITING USE, DISCLOSURE, AND RETENTION Personal information shall not be used or disclosed for purposes other than those for which it was collected, except with the consent of the individual or as required by law. Personal information shall be retained only as long as necessary for the fulfillment of those purposes.

ACCURACY Personal information shall be as accurate, complete, and up to date as is necessary for the purposes for which it is to be used.

SAFEGUARDS Personal information shall be protected by security safeguards appropriate to the sensitivity of the information.

OPENNESS An organization shall make readily available to individuals specific information about its policies and practices relating to the management of personal information.

INDIVIDUAL ACCESS Upon request, an individual shall be informed of the existence, use, and disclosure of his or her personal information, and shall be given access to that information. An individual shall be able to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the information and have it amended as appropriate.

CHALLENGING COMPLIANCE An individual shall be able to address a challenge concerning compliance with the above principles to the designated individual or individuals accountable for the organization's compliance.

McKendry, supra note 19, at 19. Return to text.

[188] See CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 186. Return to text.

[189] See McKendry, supra note 19, at 18; CAVOUKIAN & TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 187-90. Return to text.

[190] See FLA. STAT. § 119.01 (1995); see also supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[191] See Barfield v. City of Ft. Lauderdale Police Dep't, 639 So. 2d 1012, 1014 (Fla. 1994). Return to text.

[192] McKendry, supra note 19, at 19. Return to text.

[193] Legislative mandates should not be included in the constitutional provision itself. The constitution is meant to set forth basic rights that are to be protected, as necessary, by legislation. As former Florida Supreme Court Justice Parker Lee McDonald stated in an advisory opinion to the Attorney General:

The legal principles in the state constitution inherently command a higher status than any other legal rules in our society. By transcending time and changing political mores, the constitution is a document that provides stability in the law and society's consensus on general, fundamental values. Statutory law, on the other hand, provides a set of legal rules that are specific, easily amended, and adaptable to the political, economic, and social changes of our society.
Advisory Op. to the Atty Gen. re Limited Marine Net Fishing, 620 So. 2d 997, 1000 (Fla. 1993) (McDonald, J., concurring). Return to text.

[194] See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text. Return to text.

[195] See PFAFFENBERGER, supra note 15. Return to text.

[196] See id. at 17-30. Return to text.

[197] See id. at 31-40. Return to text.

[198] See id. at 256-68. Return to text.

[199] See id. at 56-65. Return to text.

[200] See id. at 170-81. Return to text.

[201] See id. at 182-200. Return to text.

[202] See id. at 210-29. Return to text.

[203] CAVOUKIAN and TAPSCOTT, supra note 1, at 200-01. Return to text.

[204] O'Malley, supra note 18, at 61. Return to text.