[*] The author would like to thank the staff of the Florida State University Law Review for their assistance in researching, editing, and creating this Comment. Also, the author expresses special gratitude to her husband, Matt, and her children, Nicholas and Meagan, for their patience and support. Return to text.

[1] See Tom Bayles, Committee Approves Sex Offender Bill; Predators Would Be Forced Into Treatment, FLA. TIMES UNION, Mar. 13, 1998, at B4; Jay Weaver, Measure Could Delay Release of Violent Predators, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Apr. 21, 1998, at B6. Return to text.

[2] See Mike Schneider, Chavez Convicted of Ryce Murder, TALL. DEM., Sept. 19, 1998, at C5. Return to text.

[3] See New Law Keeps Pedophiles Institutionalized After Prison, FLA. TODAY, May 20, 1998, at B6. Return to text.

[4] See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, § 24, 1998 Fla. Laws 445, 455 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 916.31-.49 (Supp. 1998)) (effective Jan. 1, 1999). Return to text.

[5] See id. Return to text.

[6] See FLA. STAT. § 916.37(2) (Supp. 1998). Return to text.

[7] See id. § 916.33(1). Return to text.

[8] See id. § 916.33(9). Return to text.

[9] See discussion infra Part III. Return to text.

[10] See discussion infra Part IV.B. Return to text.

[11] Dana Calvo, New State Law Inspired by Jimmy Ryce Death; Some Sex Predators to Be Held Longer, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., May 20, 1998, at B8 (quoting Claudine Ryce). Return to text.

[12] See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to 29a17 (1994). Return to text.

[13] 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Return to text.

[14] See id. at 361. Return to text.

[15] See id. at 356. Return to text.

[16] See id. at 356-58. Return to text.

[17] See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, 1998 Fla. Laws 445 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 916.31-.49 (Supp. 1998)). Return to text.

[18] FLA. STAT. § 916.33(3) (Supp. 1998). Return to text.

[19] Id. Return to text.

[20] A "sexually violent offense" is defined as the following:

(a) Murder of a human being while engaged in sexual battery in violation of s. 782.04(1)(a)2;
(b) Kidnapping of a child under the age of 16 and, in the course of that offense, committing: 1. Sexual battery; or 2. A lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child; (c) Committing the offense of false imprisonment upon a child under the age of 16 and, in the course of that offense committing: 1. Sexual battery; or 2. A lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon or in the presence of the child; (d) Sexual battery in violation of s. 794.011; (e) Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of the child in violation of s. 800.04; (f) An attempt, criminal solicitation, or conspiracy, in violation of s. 777.04, of a sexually violent offense; (g) Any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time before October 1, 1998, which is comparable to a sexually violent offense under paragraphs (a)-(f) or any federal conviction or conviction in another state for a felony offense that in this state would be a sexually violent offense; or (h) Any criminal act that, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil commitment proceedings under ss. 916.30-916.49, has been determined beyond a reasonable doubt to have been sexually motivated. Id. § 916.32(8). The Act applies not only to persons convicted after its effective date, but also to persons already in custody when the Act took effect. See id. § 916.45. Return to text.

[21] See id. § 916.33(1)(a). Return to text.

[22] Id. § 916.33(3). Return to text.

[23] Id. § 916.32(9). The definition of "sexually violent predator" will be analyzed and discussed extensively in Part IV. Return to text.

[24] See id. § 916.34. Return to text.

[25] Id. § 916.35(4). Return to text.

[26] See id. § 916.35(1)-(2). Return to text.

[27] See id. Return to text.

[28] See id. § 916.36(1)-(2). Return to text.

[29] See id. § 916.36(3). Return to text.

[30] See id. § 916.36(5). Return to text.

[31] See id. § 916.37(1). The Kansas statute, found constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, requires a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a) (1994); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 353 (1997). Return to text.

[32] See FLA. STAT. § 916.37(1) (Supp. 1998). Return to text.

[33] See id. § 916.37(2). Return to text.

[34] See id. Although the Act does not specifically prescribe the treatment and care of the inmate, it broadly instructs that "long-term control, care, and treatment of a person committed under [the Act] . . . must conform to constitutional requirements." Id. § 916.42. Return to text.

[35] See id. § 916.38(1), (3). Return to text.

[36] Id. § 916.38(3). Return to text.

[37] See id. Return to text.

[38] See id. Return to text.

[39] Id. § 916.38(4). Return to text.

[40] See id. § 916.40. Return to text.

[41] 521 U.S. 346 (1997). Return to text.

[42] See id. at 361 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)). Return to text.

[43] See id. Return to text.

[44] See id. The Florida Legislature similarly asserts a civil code intent for the Jimmy Ryce Act. See FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998). Return to text.

[45] See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362. Return to text.

[46] See id. Return to text.

[47] See id. Return to text.

[48] See id. at 363. Return to text.

[49] Hon. Tom Malone, The Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act—Post Hendricks, J. KAN. B.A., Feb.-Mar. 1998, at 36, 37 (footnotes omitted). Return to text.

[50] Andrew Hammel, Comment, The Importance of Being Insane: Sexual Predator Civil Commitment Laws and the Idea of Sex Crimes as Insane Acts, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 775, 789 (1995). Return to text.

[51] See Calvo, supra note 11, at B8 (Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Repub., Miami). Return to text.

[52] See Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators' Treatment and Care Act, ch. 98-64, 1998 Fla. Laws 445 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 916.31-.49 (Supp. 1998)). Return to text.

[53] See supra Part I. In this respect, the Jimmy Ryce Act follows a string of legislation inspired by tragic crimes. Examples include "Jenna's Law," ending parole for violent felons, "Megan's Law," regarding community notification of the location of sex offenders, and "Joan's Law," imposing life-without-parole on child murderers. See Dale Russakoff, Out of Grief Comes a Legislative Force, WASH. POST, June 15, 1998, at A1. Return to text.

[54] See Thomas B. Pfankuch, Bills Would Prey on Sexual Predators, FLA. TIMES UNION, Apr. 17, 1998, at B1. Return to text.

[55] See Fla. HB 3737 (1998). On May 28, 1999, House Bill 3737 became law without the Governor's signature. See Act effective July 1, 1998, ch. 98-267, 1998 Fla. Laws 2289 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (1997)). Return to text.

[56] See Fla. SB 310 (1998) (died in committee). Return to text.

[57] See Fla. SB 514 (1998) (vetoed by the Governor). Return to text.

[58] See Act effective Oct. 1, 1997, ch. 97-184, 1997 Fla. Laws 3455 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (1997)). Return to text.

[59] See Ardy Friedberg & Ty Tagami, Experts: Toughen Up on Predators; Still, They Disagree on Notification and Treatment, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Mar. 8, 1997, at A1. Return to text.

[60] Id. Return to text.

[61] See Candace J. Samolinski, Chiles Signs Sexual Predators Law, TAMPA TRIB., May 20, 1998, at 1. Return to text.

[62] See Grace Frank, Costs Hinder Jimmy Ryce Act, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 13, 1998, at 8. Return to text.

[63] FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998) ("It is therefore the intent of the Legislature to create a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators."). Return to text.

[64] See Candace J. Samolinski, When Predators Walk After Horrible Cases of Sexual Abuse, the Florida Legislature Considers Placing Released Convicts in Mental Institutions, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 1, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Samolinski, When Predators Walk] (noting that, by the year 2000, the program could cost $158.6 million per year); see also Candace J. Samolinski, Kansas Law Used for Jimmy Ryce Act, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 26, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Samolinski, Kansas Law] ("Operating costs are estimated at $60 million the first year and projected to climb to nearly $200 million over the next two years."). Return to text.

[65] See, e.g., Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1 (noting that Sen. Alberto Gutman, Repub., Miami, "scoffed at the department's price estimates"); see also Jay Weaver, Measure Could Delay Release of Violent Predators, FT. LAUD. SUN SENT., Apr. 21, 1998, at B6 (stating that Rep. Alex Villalobos, Repub., Miami, estimated that each inmate would cost $30,000 per year, while the Department estimates the figure at $100,000 per year). Rep. Villalobos indicated he expected the number of persons committed in Florida to be half that of California, where only 80 sex offenders were committed last year. See Jackie Hallifax, House Passes "Jimmy Ryce" Bill, ASSOC. PRESS POL. SERV., Apr. 20, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7406260. However, the Department anticipates 600 commitments in the first year, and it notes that though California only committed 80 in the first two years, it has 330 inmates awaiting decisions. See id.

66 See Samolinski, Kansas Law, supra note 64, at 1.

67 See Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1.

68 Samolinski, supra note 61, at 1.

69 See Frank, supra note 62, at 8.

70 Repub., Miami.

71 See Calvo, supra note 11, at B8.

72 Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1 (quoting Brent Taylor, attorney for Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.).

73 See FLA. STAT. § 916.42 (Supp. 1998).

74 See, e.g., Senate Oks Bill to Treat Sex Offenders: Inmates Would Undergo Therapy After Prison Terms, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 25, 1998, at B8 ("We are going to take these people, after due process has been served, and put them in a facility where they can be treated." (quoting Sen. Ron Klein. Dem., Boca Raton)); Tom Bayles, supra note 1, at B4 ("In no way is this punishment although it gets them off the streets for treatment." (quoting Sen. Alberto Gutman, Repub., Miami)).

75 See discussion infra Part IV.B.

76 FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998).

77 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).

78 See id.

79 See FLA. STAT. § 916.32(2), (9)(a) (Supp. 1998).

80 See discussion supra Part III.B.3.a.

81 See In re Smith, 342 So. 2d 491, 491 (Fla. 1977) (citing In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977)) (reversing and remanding to determine if there was a "less restrictive alternative" to involuntary commitment for mental illness); Reigosa v. State, 362 So. 2d 714, 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (remanding to determine the possibility of "less restrictive alternatives" to involuntary commitment for mental illness).

82 See Reigosa, 362 So. 2d at 715.

83 See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.217(b).

84 FLA. STAT. § 916.32(9)(b) (Supp. 1998).

85 See Samolinski, supra note 61, at 1.

86 See Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1.

87 See, e.g., Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190, 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).

88 Id.

89 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 381 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

90 See discussion infra Part IV.B.

91 FLA. STAT. § 916.32(5) (Supp. 1998).

92 See discussion infra Part IV.

93 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1986).

94 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (footnotes omitted), cited with approval in Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.

95 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361-62.

96 See id. at 363.

97 See id. at 370-71 (explaining the inapplicability to the Kansas statute of the successive prosecution "same elements" test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and concluding the statute survives a Double Jeopardy Clause challenge).

98 See id. at 362.

99 See, e.g., Calvo, supra note 11, at B8; see also, Samolinski, When Predators Walk, supra note 64, at 1 (citing the lack of a statutory monitoring plan to indicate confinement as the Jimmy Ryce Act's primary thrust).

100 See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (holding that the purpose of deterrence may serve both civil and criminal goals).

101 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 362.

102 See id. at 380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

103 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).

104 See KENT S. MILLER, MANAGING MADNESS: THE CASE AGAINST CIVIL COMMITMENT 16 (1976).

105 See id.

106 See id. at 16-18.

107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

108 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).

109 See id. at 390-91; California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1995) (finding that although the Ex Post Facto Clause forbids retroactively increasing punishment for criminal acts, it does not forbid an amendment that decreases the frequency of parole suitability hearings available to a petitioner convicted prior to the amendment).

110 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629-32 (1988).

111 U.S. CONST. amend. V.

112 JAY A. SIGLER, Preface to DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY v (1969) (citing United States v. Keen, 27 F. Cas. 686 (C.C.D. Ind. 1839) (No. 15,510).

113 Id.

114 See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992).

115 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979).

116 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.

117 See id. at 82-83.

118 See id. at 75-76.

119 See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).

120 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360 n.3 (1997) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).

121 See generally id. at 359-60.

122 See James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: Substantive Due Process, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95, 105 (1996).

123 See generally id. at 95-105.

124 See id. at 105.

125 Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 643-44 (1992).

126 See id. at 644-45.

127 See Galloway, supra note 125, at 638-39.

128 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).

129 See Galloway, supra note 125, at 638-39.

130 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).

131 Id. at 357.

132 See id. at 360 n.3.

133 Id. at 374 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

134 Id. at 375.

135 504 U.S. 71 (1992).

136 Id. at 80 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).

137 Id. at 79.

138 Id. at 81.

139 See id. at 116-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that rational basis review was appropriate). See also generally The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 210 (1992) (discussing the Court's departure from the ordinary substantive due process two-tier framework).

140 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373-74 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

141 FLA. STAT. § 916.32(5), (9) (Supp. 1998); accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a), (b) (1997).

142 See Amicus Brief for the Washington State Psychiatric Assoc. in Support of Respondent at 16, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (No. 95-1649) (citing Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 750 (W.D. Wash. 1995)) [hereinafter WSPA Brief].

143 See FLA. STAT. § 916.32(9) (Supp. 1998) (defining "sexually violent predator" as any person who "[h]as been convicted of a sexually violent offense" and who "[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment") (emphasis added).

144 See id. § 916.31 (defining "mental abnormality" as a "mental condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses").

145 See Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 908 (1994). McCaffrey describes the circularity problem as follows:

Another possible danger is that "'mental abnormality' will be established in a circular manner only by virtue of the sexual offending behavior itself. In that case, the abnormality is derived from the sexual behavior which in turn is used to establish the predisposition to other sexual behavior." It has also been argued that the term "'mental abnormality' has no clinically significant meaning and no recognized diagnostic use." . . . Thus, the "causative relationship that must be shown under the statute between the disorder and the criminal sexual behavior . . . is often a matter of speculation or meaningless circularity."
Id. (citations omitted); see also John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1319-20 (1996) (noting the circularity problem but arguing that under such definitions, not all persons who have committed sexually violent crimes will be found to have mental illnesses); Hammel, supra note 50, at 796 (addressing the circularity in a similar Washington statute).

146 See WSPA Brief, supra note 142, at 17.

147 See id. at 17-18.

148 See id.

149 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364-65 (1983).

150 See Leading Case—Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 HARV. L. REV. 259, 267-68 (1997).

151 See id. at 268; see also Brian J. Pollock, Note, Kansas v. Hendricks: A Workable Standard for "Mental Illness" or a Push Down the Slippery Slope Toward State Abuse of Civil Commitment?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 319, 346-48 (1998).

152 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).

153 Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

154 See id.

155 See, e.g., James D. Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness or Abnormality? A Psychiatrist's Perspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 849 (1992) (discussing that the Washington Legislature passed the Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act, which was drafted without the participation of a psychiatrist).

156 See id. at 852 ("A psychiatrist's definition of 'mental disorder' includes the loss of contact with reality, confusion, loss of reason, or hallucinations.").

157 MICHAEL ALFRED PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY 55 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1975).

158 See id.

159 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS xxii (4th ed. 1994).

160 See Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 161, 188 (1995).

161 See, e.g., Reardon, supra note 155, at 851.

162 See Schopp, supra note 160, at 188.

163 See id.

164 Id.

165 Id.

166 See, e.g., Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 238-40 (1991).

167 See, e.g., Beth Keiko Fujimoto, Comment, Sexual Violence, Sanity and Safety: Constitutional Parameters for Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 879, 906-08 (1992).

168 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).

169 See Katherine P. Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between "Mad" and "Bad"—A Study of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 255-58 (1996).

170 See id.

171 See e.g., Schopp, supra note 160, at 188 (being greedy neither excuses theft nor indicates an inability to control greed-based urges).

172 See, e.g., Reardon, supra note 155, at 850.

173 See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.

174 See, e.g., Schopp, supra note 160, at 190-91.

175 See Reardon, supra note 155, at 850.

176 See discussion supra Part III.A.; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362 (1997).

177 See Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 719 (1992).

178 See e.g., McCaffrey, supra note 145, at 908 (arguing that statutory terms are legal and not clinical terms and "mental abnormality" is defined in circular fashion).

179 See id. at 897. In Foucha, the court upheld the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute, which provided for the automatic civil commitment of criminal defendants acquitted by reason of insanity. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.71 (1992).

180 See Schopp, supra note 160, at 191.

181 See id. at 192.

182 The Florida Act is facially inconsistent because, in its findings, the Legislature concedes that sex offenders are "unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities." FLA. STAT. § 916.31 (Supp. 1998). Yet, under the Act, the offender is indefinitely committed for treatment. See id.

183 See id. § 916.32(9).

184 Blakey, supra note 169, at 229 (arguing that repeat sexual offenders who are "mad" are somewhat morally culpable, but less culpable than ordinary, completely sane persons).

185 See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 782 (1985).

186 In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609, 615 (Minn. 1994) (Gardebring, J., dissenting) (reviewing Minnesota's sexual predator commitment statute). For a full discussion of Linehan, see Hammel, supra note 50, at 786-91.

187 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 568 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1990); Mines v. State, 390 So. 2d 332, 337 (Fla. 1980); Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla. 1977). Florida statutes, however, recognize lack of volitional control as a mitigating factor to be considered before the imposition of a death sentence. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6)(b) (1997) (stating that one legitimate mitigating factor occurs when "[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance"); see also id. § 921.141(6)(f) (stating that another mitigating factor occurs when "[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired").

188 See, e.g., Hall, 568 So. 2d at 885; Gurganus v. State, 451 So. 2d 817, 820-21 (Fla. 1984); Wheeler, 344 So. 2d at 245; Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969).

189 See Michelle Migdal Gee, Annotation, Modern Status of Test of Criminal Responsibility-State Cases, 9 A.L.R. 4th 526, 529-30 (1981) (noting that the M'Naghten Rule has been widely criticized).

190 See Wheeler, 344 So. 2d at 245. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provides:

(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1985) (emphasis added).

191 See, e.g., Robert Teir & Kevin Coy, Approaches to Sexual Predators: Community Notification and Civil Commitment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 405, 425-26 (1997).

192 See Blakey, supra note 169, at 240.

193 Id. at 28-29.

194 Teir & Coy, supra note 191, at 425-26.

195 See id. Return to text.